Abstract-The capacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel model is analyzed when there are multiple antennas at the sender, intended receiver and eavesdropper. The associated channel matrices are fixed and known to all the terminals. A computable characterization of the secrecy capacity is established as the saddle point solution to a minimax problem. The converse is based on a Sato-type argument used in other broadcast settings, and the coding theorem is based on Gaussian wiretap codebooks.
broadcast channel to transmit a message reliably to the intended receiver, while leaking asymptotically no information to the eavesdropper. A single-letter characterization of the secrecy capacity when the underlying broadcast channel is discrete and memoryless is developed in [2] . An explicit solution for the scalar Gaussian case is obtained in [3] , where the optimality of Gaussian codebooks is established.
In this paper, we consider the case where there are multiple antennas at each of the three terminals, referring to it as the multi-input, multi-output, multi-eavesdropper (MIMOME) channel. In our model, the channel matrices are fixed and known to all three terminals. While the eavesdropper's channel being known to both the sender and the receiver in the problem formulation is a strong assumption, we remark in advance that the solution provides ultimate limits on secure transmission with multiple antennas, and thus serves as a starting point for other formulations. Further discussion of the modeling assumptions is provided in the companion paper [4] and the compound extension has been recently treated in [5] .
The problem of evaluating the secrecy capacity of channels with multiple antennas has attracted increasing attention in recent years. As a starting point, for Gaussian models in which the channel matrices of intended receiver and eavesdropper are square and diagonal, the results in [6] [7] [8] [9] , which consider secure transmission over fading channels, can be applied. In particular, for this special case of independent parallel Gaussian subchannels, it follows that using independent Gaussian wiretap codebooks across the subchannels achieves capacity.
More generally, the MIMOME channel is a nondegraded broadcast channel to which the Csiszár-Körner capacity expression [2] applies in principle. However, computing the capacity directly from [2] appears difficult, as observed in, e.g., [10] [11] [12] [13] .
To the best of our knowledge, the first computable upper bound for the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian multi-antenna wiretap channel appears in [4] , [14] , which is used to establish the secrecy capacity in the special (MISOME) case that the intended receiver has a single antenna. This approach involves revealing the output of the eavesdropper's channel to the legitimate receiver to create a fictitious degraded broadcast channel, and results in a minimax expression for the upper bound, analogous to the technique of Sato [15] used to upper bound the sum-capacity of the multi-antenna broadcast channel; see, e.g., [16] .
In [4] , [14] , this minimax upper bound is used to obtain a closed-form expression for the secrecy capacity in the MISOME case. In addition, a number of insights are developed into the behavior of the secrecy capacity. In the high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regime, the simple masked beamforming scheme developed in [11] is shown to be near optimal. Also, the scaling behavior of the secrecy capacity in the limit of many antennas is studied.
We note that this upper bounding approach has been independently conceived by Ulukus et al. [17] and further applied to the case of two transmit antennas, two receive antennas, and a single eavesdropper antenna [18] . Subsequently, this minimax upper bound was shown to be tight for the MIMOME case in [19] and, independently, [20] (see also [21] ). Both treatments start from the minimax upper bound of [4] and work with the optimality conditions to establish that the saddle value is achievable with the standard Gaussian wiretap code construction [2] .
In some of the most recent work, [22] provides an alternative derivation of the MIMOME secrecy capacity using an approach based on channel-enhancement techniques introduced in [23] . The two approaches shed complementary insights into the problem. The minimax upper bounding approach in [19] , [20] provides a computable characterization for the capacity expression and identifies a hidden convexity in optimizing the Csiszár-Körner expression with Gaussian inputs, whereas the channel enhancement approach does not. On the other hand the latter approach establishes the capacity given any covariance constraint on the input distribution, not just the sum-power constraint to which the minimax upper bounding approach has been limited.
Finally, the diversity-multiplexing tradeoff of the multiantenna wiretap channel has been recently studied in [24] .
An outline of the paper is as follows. Section II summarizes some notational conventions for the paper. Section III describes the basic channel and system model, as well as a canonical decomposition of the channel in terms of its generalized singular values, which is used in some of the asymptotic analysis. Section IV summarizes the main results of the paper, and Sections V-VII provide the corresponding analysis. In particular, Section V develops the minimax characterization of the secrecy capacity, Section VI develops the high SNR analysis in terms of the generalized singular values, and Section VII develops the conditions under which the secrecy capacity is zero in the limit of many antennas. Finally, Section VIII contains some concluding remarks.
II. NOTATION
In terms of fonts, bold upper and lower case characters are used for matrices and vectors, respectively. Random variables are distinguished from their realizations by the use of sanserif fonts for the former and regular serifed fonts for the latter. Sets are denoted using caligraphic fonts. We generally reserve the symbols I(·) for mutual information, and h(·) for differential entropy, and all logarithms are base-2 unless otherwise indicated. In addition, CN(0, K) denotes a circularly-symmetrix complex-valued Gaussian random vector with covariance matrix K.
The set of all n-dimensional complex-valued vectors is denoted by C n , and the set of m × n-dimensional matrices is denoted using C m×n . In addition, I denotes the identity matrix and 0 denotes the zero matrix. When the dimensions of these matrices is not clear from context, we will explicily indicate their size via subscripts; e.g., 0 n×m denotes an n× m zero matrix, 0 n denotes a vector of zeros of length n, and I n denotes an n × n identity matrix. We further use the notation [·] i:j for j ≥ i to denote the subvector of its vector argument corresponding to indices i, i + 1, . . . , j. Likewise, [·] i:j,k:l denotes the submatrix formed from rows i through j and columns k through l of its matrix argument. Matrix transposition is denoted using the superscript T , the Hermitian (i.e., conjugate) transpose of a matrix is denoted using the superscript † , the Moore-Penrose pseudo-inverse is denoted by ‡ , and the projection matrix onto the null space is denoted by ♯ . In addition, Null(·), rank(·), and σ max (·) denote the null space, rank, and largest singular value, respectively, of their matrix arguments. Moreover, we say a matrix has full column-rank if its rank is equal to the number of columns, and the notation A ≻ 0 means that A is positive definite, with A 0 likewise denoting positive semidefiniteness.
In other notation, dim(·) denotes the dimension of its subspace argument, span(·) denotes the subspace spanned by the collection of vectors that are its argument, ⊥ denotes the orthogonal complement of a subspace. Moreover, · denotes the usual Euclidean norm of a vector argument, tr(·) and det(·) denote the trace and determinant of a matrix, respectively, and diag(·) denotes a diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements are given by its argument.
Finally, we use a.s.
= and a.s.
−→ to denote almost-sure equality and convergence, respectively, and additionally use standard order notation. Specifically, O(ǫ) and o(ǫ) denote terms such that O(ǫ)/ǫ < ∞ and o(ǫ)/ǫ → 0, respectively, in the associated limit, so that, e.g., o(1) represents a vanishing term.
III. CHANNEL AND SYSTEM MODEL Using n t , n r , and n e to denote the number of antennas at the sender, intended receiver, and eavesdropper, respectively, the received signals at the intended receiver and eavesdropper in the channel model of interest are, respectively,
where x(t) is the transmitted signal, where H r ∈ C nr×nt and H e ∈ C ne×nt are complex channel gain matrices, and where z r (t) and z e (t) are each independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) noises whose samples are CN(0, I) random variables. The channel matrices are constant (over the transmission interval) and known to all the three terminals. Moreover, the channel input satisfies the power constraint
A rate R is achievable if there exists a sequence of length n codes such that both the error probability at the intended receiver and I(w ; y n e )/n approach zero as n → ∞. The secrecy capacity is the supremum of all achievable rates.
A. Channel Decomposition
For some of our analysis, it will be convenient to exploit the generalized singular value decomposition (GSVD) [25] , [26] of the channel (1). To develop this decomposition, we first define the subspaces
corresponding to classes of inputs that have nonzero gain to, respectively, the intended receiver only, both intended receiver and eavesdropper, the eavesdropper only, and neither. Letting
it follows that dim(S n ) = n t − k. Moreover, we use the notation
from which it follows that dim(S e ) = k − p − s. Using this notation, our channel decomposition is as follows.
Definition 1: The GSVD of (H r , H e ) takes the form
where Ψ r ∈ C nr×nr , Ψ e ∈ C ne×ne and Ψ t ∈ C nt×nt are unitary, where Ω ∈ C k×k is lower triangular and nonsingular, and where
are diagonal with
the diagonal entries of which are real and strictly positive. The associated generalized singular values are
For convenience, we choose the (otherwise arbitrary) indexing so that σ 1 ≤ σ 2 ≤ · · · ≤ σ s .
IV. SUMMARY OF MAIN RESULTS
In this section we summarize the main results in this paper. The analysis is provided in Sections V-VII.
A. MIMOME Secrecy Capacity
A characterization of the secrecy capacity of the MIMOME channel is as follows.
Theorem 1: The secrecy capacity of the MIMOME wiretap channel (1) is
where
with x ∼ CN(0, K P ) and
and where
Furthermore, the minimax problem of (10) is convex-concave with saddle point solution (K P ,K Φ ), via which the secrecy capacity can be expressed in the form
Finally, C = 0 if and only if
whereΘ
with
denoting the coefficient in the linear minimum mean-square error (MMSE) estimate of y r from y e , Several remarks are worthwhile. First, our result can be related to the Csiszár-Körner characterization of the secrecy capacity for a nondegraded discrete memoryless broadcast channel p yr,ye|x in the form [2] 
where u is an auxiliary random variable (over some alphabet with bounded cardinality) that satisfies the Markov constraint u ↔ x ↔ (y r , y e ). As [2] remarks, the secrecy capacity (19) can be extended to incorporate continuous-valued inputs of the type of interest in the present paper. With such an extension, Theorem 1, and in particular (15) , can be interpreted as (indirectly) establishing a suitable Gaussian wiretap code for achieving capacity. 2 Specifically, via the chain rule,
I(x; y r |y e ) = I(x; y r ) − I(x; y e ) + I(x; y e |y r ) 1 The constraint K Φ 0 is equivalently expressed as the requirement that σmax(Φ) ≤ 1, as we will exploit. 2 Each candidate (u, x) in (19) corresponds to a particular coding scheme based on binning, which we generically refer as a "wiretap code," which achieves rate I(u; yr) − I(u; ye).
where the last term on the right-hand side is zero when Φ = Φ, and thus we have the following immediate corollary.
Corollary 1: The secrecy capacity of the MIMOME wiretap channel is achieved by a wiretap coding scheme in which u ∼ CN(0, K P ) with K P =K P , and x = u.
From this perspective, our result can also be interpreted as a convex reformulation of the nonconvex optimization (19) . Indeed, even after knowing that both an optimizing u is Gaussian and x = u is sufficient-which itself is nontrivialdetermining the optimal covariance viā
with K P as defined in (12) , is a nonconvex problem. 3 And even if one verifies thatK P satisfies the Karush-KuhnTucker (KKT) conditions associated with (20) , these necessary conditions only establish local optimality, i.e., thatK P is a stationary point of the associated objective function. By contrast, (10) establishes that the (global) solution to (20) is obtained as the solution to a convex problem, as well as establishing the optimality of a Gaussian input distribution.
Second, additional insights are obtained from the structure of the saddle point solution (K P ,K Φ ). In particular, usingΦ to denote the optimal cross-covariance, i.e., [cf. (14) ]
we establish in the course of our development of Theorem 1 the following key property.
Property 1:
The saddle point solution (K P ,K Φ ) to the MIMOME wiretap channel capacity (10) satisfies
provided H r =ΘH e (i.e., provided C = 0). It follows from (22) that the effective channel to the eavesdropper is a degraded version of that to the intended receiver. Indeed, the intended receiver can simulate the eavesdropper channel by adding noise. Specifically, it generates
where the added noise w ∼ CN(0, I −Φ †Φ ) is independent of y r , so, using (1), (22) , and the notation x =Sx ′ with x ′ ∼ CN(0, I), we have
where z ′ e ∼ CN(0, I). In essence, the optimal signal design for transmission is such that no information is transmitted along any direction where the eavesdropper observes a stronger signal than the legitimate receiver. A key consequence is that a genie-aided system in which y e is provided to the receiver, which would otherwise provide only an upper bound 3 Note that in the high-SNR regime, (20) reduces to
, which is the well-studied multiple-discriminant function in multivariate statistics; see, e.g., [27] .
on capacity in general, does not increase the capacity of the channel in this case, a feature that is ultimately central to our analysis.
Finally, the condition (16) corresponding to when the secrecy capacity is zero has a natural physical interpretation. In particular, under this condition, the effective channel to the intended receiver is a degraded version of that to the eavesdropper. Indeed, the eavesdropper can simulate the intended receiver by adding noise. Specifically, it generates y ′ r =Θy e + w, where the added noise w ∼ CN(0, I −ΦΦ † ) is independent of y r , so, using (1) we have
which follows from (17) with (18).
B. Secrecy Capacity in the High-SNR Regime
In the high-SNR limit (i.e., P → ∞), the secrecy capacity (10) is naturally described in terms of the GSVD of the channel (1) as defined in (6) . The GSVD simultaneously diagonalizes the H r and H e , yielding an equivalent parallel channel model for the problem. As such, a capacity-approaching scheme in the high-SNR regime involves using for transmission (with a wiretap code) only those subchannels for which the gain to the intended receiver is larger, and the following convenient expression for the capacity (10) results.
Theorem 2: Let σ 1 ≤ σ 2 ≤ . . . ≤ σ s be the generalized singular values of (H r , H e ). Then as P → ∞, the secrecy capacity of the MIMOME wiretap channel (1) takes the asymptotic form
with p and s as given in (5), and with H ♯ e denoting the projection matrix onto Null(H e ).
Note that a simple and intuitive transmission scheme for the MIMOME channel would involve simultaneously and isotropically transmitting information in Null(H r ) ⊥ , where there is gain to the intended receiver, and (synthetic) noise in Null(H r ), which does not affect the intended receiver but does reduce the quality of the eavesdroppers received signal. 4 This "masked" multi-input, multi-output (MIMO) transmission scheme is the natural generalization of the masked beamforming proposed in [11] for the MISOME wiretap channel. For the MISOME channel, such an approach is near optimal, as shown in [4] . However, we now show that such a masked multi-input multi-output (MIMO) scheme can be quite far from optimal on the MIMOME channel.
For convenience, we restrict our attention to the case in which n r ≤ n t ≤ n e and H r and H e are full rank-i.e., rank(H r ) = n r and rank(H e ) = n t -and thus k = n t , p = 0, and s = n r in the GSVD.
The masked MIMO scheme is naturally viewed as a wiretap coding scheme in which a particular (rather than optimal) choice for (x, u) is imposed in (19) . In particular, first we choose u to correspond to (information-bearing) codewords in a randomly generated codebook, i.e.,
where the elements are generated in an i.i.d. manner according to CN(0, P t ) with
Additionally, we let b nr+1 , . . . , b nt be randomly generated (synthetic) noise, i.e., independent CN(0, P t ) random variables. Next, we choose the transmission x according to
where the vectors v 1 , . . . , v nt are chosen as follows. Let
be the compact singular value decomposition (SVD) of H r . Since rank(H r ) = n r , this means that U is n r ×n r and unitary, ∆ is n r × n r and diagonal with positive diagonal elements, and V r is n t × n r with orthogonal columns. Then we choose v 1 , . . . , v nr in (26c) as the columns of V r , i.e.,
and (freely) choose
a basis for the null space of H r , so that V r V n is unitary. As we will establish, substituting these parameters in the argument of (19) yields the achievable rate
which in the high-SNR regime reduces to
where the second equality comes from expanding H r and H e via (6), with σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . denoting the generalized singular values (9) . Comparing (30) and (24), we see that the asymptotic gap to capacity is
which, evidently, can be arbitrarily large when there are small singular values.
In concluding this section, we emphasize that only in the high-SNR regime do the generalized singular values of (H r , H e ) completely characterize the capacity-achieving and masked MIMO coding schemes.
C. MIMOME Channel Scaling Laws
By using sufficiently many antennas, the eavesdropper can drive to secrecy capacity to zero. In such a regime, the eavesdropper would be able to decode a nonvanishing fraction of any sent message-even when the sender and receiver fully exploit knowledge of H e . In general, this threshold depends on the numbers of antennas at the transmitter and intended receiver, as well as on the particular channels to intended receiver and eavesdropper. One characterization of this threshold is given by (16) in Theorem 1. An equivalent characterization that is more useful in the development of scaling laws, is as follows.
Claim 1: The secrecy capacity of the MIMOME channel is zero if and only if
where σ max (H r , H e ) denotes the channel's largest generalized singular value. When the coefficients of the channels are drawn at random, and the numbers of antennas are large, the threshold becomes independent of the channel realization. The following result characterizes this scaling behavior. Corollary 2: Suppose that H r and H e have i.i.d. CN(0, 1) entries that are fixed for the entire period of transmission, and known to all the terminals. Then when n r , n e , n t → ∞ such that γ n r /n e and β n t /n e are fixed constants, the secrecy capacity satisfies C(H r , H e ) a.s. Fig. 1 depicts the zero-capacity region (32) . In this plot, the solid curve describes the relative number of antennas an eavesdropper needs to prevent secure communication, as a function of the antenna resources available at the transmitter and intended receiver. The related scaling law developed for the MISOME case [4] corresponds to the vertical intercept of this plot: C a.s.
−→ 0 if and only if
−→ 0 when β ≤ 1/2, i.e., when the eavesdropper has at least twice the number of antennas as the sender. Note, too, that the single transmit antenna (SIMOME) case corresponds to the horizontal intercept; in this case we see that C a.s.
−→ 0 when γ ≤ 1, i.e., when the eavesdropper has more antennas than the intended receiver.
We can further use such scaling analysis to determine the best asymptotic allocation of a (large) fixed number of antennas T between transmitter and intended receiver in the presence of an an eavesdropper. In particular, the optimum allocation is as is easily verified. Thus, the allocation that best thwarts the eavesdropper is n r /n t = 1/2, which requires the eavesdropper to use 3T antennas to prevent secure communication.
It is worth remarking that the objective function in (33) is rather insensitive to deviations from the optimal antenna allocation, as Fig. 2 demonstrates. If fact, even if we were to allocate equal numbers of antennas to the sender and the receiver, the eavesdropper would still need (3/2 + √ 2)T ≈ 2.9142 T antennas to drive the secrecy capacity to zero.
V. MIMOME SECRECY CAPACITY ANALYSIS
In this section we prove Theorem 1. Our proof involves two main parts. We first recognize the right-hand side of (10) as an upper bound on the secrecy capacity, then exploit properties of the saddle point solution to establish
where R − (K P ) is the lower bound (achievable rate) given in (15) . We begin by stating our upper bound, which is a trivial generalization of that established in [4] .
Lemma 1 ( [4]):
An upper bound on the secrecy capacity of the MIMOME channel (1) is given by
with x ∼ CN(0, K P ), and z ∼ CN(0, K Φ ), and the domain sets K P and K Φ are defined via (12) and (14) respectively. It remains to establish that this upper bound expression satisfies (34), which we do in the remainder of this section. We divide the proof into several steps, as depicted in Fig. 3 .
Furthermore, we remark in advance that the analysis throughout is slightly simpler when K Φ ≻ 0. Accordingly, in the following sections we focus on this nonsingular case and defer analysis for the singular case to appendices as it arises in our development. The key to analysis of the singular case is replacing the observations y r with reduced but equivalent observations. In particular, we will make use of the following claim, a proof of which is provided in Appendix I.
Claim 2: Let the singular value decomposition of Φ be expressed the form
Then if p x is such that I(x; y r |y e ) < ∞, we have I(x; y r |y e ) = I(x;ỹ r |y e ),
Symmetrically, if p x is such that I(x; y e |y r ) < ∞, we have I(x; y e |y r ) = I(x;ỹ e |y r ),
Finally, for any p x we have that I(x; y r |y e ) = ∞ if and only if
where K P is the covariance associated with p x , and where
Note that when (38) holds, the equivalent model holds and
is the equivalent noise cross-covariance.
A. Existence of a Saddle Point Solution
We first show that the minimax upper bound is a convexconcave problem with a (finite) saddle point solution.
Lemma 2: The upper bound (35) has a saddle point solution, i.e., there exists (
holds for each (K P , K Φ ) ∈ K P × K Φ . Moreover, the saddle value is finite, i.e.,
Proof: Since the constraint sets K P and K Φ are convex and compact, from a special case of Sion's minimax theorem [28] it suffices to show that
To first establish (P1), we begin by writing I(x; y r |y e ) = I(x; y r , y e ) − I(x; y e ),
and observe that the second term in (49) is fixed for each K Φ ∈ K Φ . Thus it suffices to show that with x ∼ CN(0, K P ), the first term in (49) is convex in K Φ . This is established in, e.g., [29, Lemma II-3, p. 3076]. We next establish (P2). With slight abuse of notation, we define R + (p x , K Φ ) = I(x; y r |y e ) with x ∼ p x and z ∼ CN(0, K Φ ). By contrast, our original notation R + (Q, K Φ ) corresponds to the special case of ] . Then the required concavity follows from
Verifying (50) is straightforward when K Φ is nonsingular, i.e., Φ 2 < 1. Specifically, with
denoting the error covariance associated with the linear MMSE estimate Θ(K P , K Φ )y e of y r from y e , a simple generalization of [4, Lemma 2] yields I(x; y r |y e ) = h(y r |y e ) − h(z r |z e )
= h(y r |y e ) − log det
where the last inequality is satisfied with equality if p x = CN(0, K P ). When K Φ is singular, (53) is not well-defined, so some straightforward modifications to the approach are required; these we detail in Appendix II. Finally, to verify (48), it suffices to note that
where the second inequality follows from the chain rule I(x; y r |y e ) = I(x; y e , y r ) − I(x; y e ), and where the last inequality follows from the fact that cov(z) = I.
B. Property of the Saddle Point
To simplify evaluation of the associated saddle value, we now develop the Property 1. For notational convenience, we defineΛ via [cf. (52)]
The required property is obtained by combining the following two lemmas.
Lemma 3: A saddle point solution
provided H r =ΘH e , whereS is a full column-rank matrix such thatSS † =K P . In particular, combining (56) and (57) we immediately obtain (22) , since for a full column-rank matrix M, Ma = 0 if and only if a = 0.
In the remainder of the section, we prove the two lemmas.
Proof of Lemma 3:
Here we consider the simpler case whenK Φ ≻ 0; the extension of the proof to the case when K Φ is singular is provided in Appendix III.
We begin by noting that the second inequality in (47) impliesK
The Lagrangian associated with the minimization (58) is
where the dual variable
is a block diagonal matrix corresponding to the constraint that the noise covariance K Φ must have identity matrices on its diagonal. The associated KKT conditions yield
with (4) into (61) and simplifying, we obtain,
To complete the proof requires a straightforward manipulation of (63) to obtain (56). Specifically, substituting forK Φ from (21) and H from (4) into (63), and carrying out the associated block matrix multiplication yields
Eliminating Υ 1 from (64) and (66), we obtain
and eliminating Υ 1 from (65) and (67), we obtain
Finally, eliminating Υ 2 from (68) and (69), we obtain
which reduces to (56) as desired. In preparation for proving Lemma 4, we establish the following key proposition, whose proof is provided in Appendix IV. (17) with (18) .
Proof of Lemma 4: Again, here we consider the simpler case whenK Φ is nonsingular; a proof for the case whenK Φ is singular is provided in Appendix V.
We begin by noting that
= arg max
where (72) follows from the first inequality in (47), where (73) follows from the fact thatK Φ ≻ 0, where (75) follows from Proposition 1, and where in (76) we have the effective channel
which is nonsingular sinceK Φ ≻ 0. Finally, becauseJ ≻ 0, showing (57) is equivalent to showing that thatH effS has full column-rank, which we establish in the sequel to conclude the proof. First, we express H eff in terms of its singular value decomposition
i.e., A and B are unitary matrices, and
where ν rank(H eff ) > 0 and Σ 0 is diagonal with strictly positive entries. We establish thatH effS has full column-rank by showing that the columns ofS are spanned by the first ν columns of B, i.e., 
for someF 0 0. To this end, substituting (78) into (76), we obtain
Now K P ∈ K P if and only if F = B † K P B ∈ K P , so (81) implies thatF
with F expressed in terms of the block notation
and where (82) follows from (79). Finally, it follows thatF 1 andF 2 , the F 1 and F 2 in (83) when F =F, are both 0. Indeed, ifF 2 = 0, then tr(F 2 ) > 0. This would contradict the optimality in (82): since the objective function only depends onF 0 , one could strictly increase the objective function by increasing the trace ofF 0 and decreasing the trace ofF 2 . Finally, sinceF 0 and F 2 = 0, it follows thatF 1 = 0.
C. Evaluation of the Saddle Value: Proof of Theorem 1
The conditions in Lemmas 3 and 4 can be used in turn to establish the tightness of the upper bound (35) .
Lemma 5: The saddle value R + (K P ,K Φ ) in (35) can be expressed as
where R − (K P ) is as given in (15) . The proof of Theorem 1 is a direct consequence of Lemma 5. If R + (K P ,K Φ ) = 0, the capacity is zero, otherwise R + (K P ,K Φ ) = R − (K P ), and the latter expression is an achievable rate as can be seen by setting p u = p x = CN(0,K P ) in the argument of (19) .
Thus, to conclude the section it remains only to prove our lemma.
Proof of Lemma 5:
Here we consider the case when whenK Φ ≻ 0, i.e., Φ 2 < 1; the proof for the case when K Φ is singular is provided in Appendix VI.
To obtain (84) when H r =ΘH e , we begin by writing the gap between upper and lower bounds as
= I(x; y r |y e ) − [I(x; y r ) − I(x; y e )] = I(x; y e |y r )
= h(y e |y r ) − h(z e |z r ), then note that this gap is zero since h(y e |y r ) = log det πeΛ b (86)
where in (86)
is the "backward" error covariance associated with the linear MMSE estimate of y e from y r , and where to obtain each of (87) and (88) we have used (22) of Property 1. To obtain (84) when H r =ΘH e , we note that
where (91) follows from the fact thatΘ in (17) is the coefficient in the MMSE estimate of y r from y e , andΦ is the coefficient in the MMSE estimate of z r from z e , where (92) follows via the relation H r =ΘH e , so that y r −Θy e = z r −Θz e , and where (93) follows from (23).
VI. CAPACITY ANALYSIS IN THE HIGH-SNR REGIME
We begin with a convenient upper bound that is used in our converse argument, then exploit the GSVD in developing the coding scheme for our achievability argument. Our high-SNR capacity results follow, and separately consider the cases where H e does and does not have full column-rank.
Lemma 6: For all choices of Θ ∈ C nr×nt and Φ ∈ C nr×ne such that Φ 2 ≤ 1, the secrecy capacity (35) of the channel (1) is upper bounded by
Proof: First note that the objective function R + (K P , K Φ ) in (11) can be expressed in the form R + (K P , K Φ ) = I(x; y r |y e ) = h(y r |y e ) − h(z r |z e ) = h(y r |y e ) − log det
Hence,
where to obtain (96) we have used (35) , where to obtain (97) we have used (95), and where to obtain (98) we have used that a minimax quantity upper bounds a corresponding maximin quantity. Finally, we further upper bound (99) by making arbitrary choices for Θ and Φ, yielding (94).
A. GSVD Properties
The following properties of the GSVD in Definition 1 are useful in our analysis.
First, the GSVD simultaneously diagonalizes the channels in our model (1) . In particular, applying (6) we obtaiñ y r (t) =Σ rx (t) +z r (t) y e (t) =Σ ex (t) +z e (t),
r y r (t) nr−p−s+1:nr y e (t) = Ψ † e y e (t) 1:k−p z r (t) = Ψ † r z r (t) nr−p−s+1:nr z e (t) = Ψ † e z e (t) 1:k−p .
The corresponding equivalent channel is as depicted in Second, the GSVD yields a characterization of the null space of H e . In particular,
where, expressing Ψ t as defined in (6) in terms of its columns ψ i , i = 1, . . . , n t , viz.,
We first verify (102). To establish (102b), it suffices to note that H r ψ j = H e ψ j = 0, j = k + 1, . . . , n t , which can be readily verified from (6) . To establish (102a), we show for all j ∈ {k − p + 1, . . . , k} that H e ψ j = 0 and that the {H r ψ j } are linearly independent. It suffices to show that the last p columns of Σ r Ω −1 are linearly independent and the last p columns of Σ e Ω −1 are zero. To this end, note that since Ω −1 in (6) is a lower triangular matrix, it can be expressed in the form
By direct block left-multiplication of (103) with (7a) and (7b), we have
Since Ω 3 is invertible (since Ω is nonsingular), the last p columns of Σ r Ω −1 are linearly independent and the last p columns of Σ e Ω −1 are zero, establishing (102a).
To characterize Null(H e ), we use (102a) and (102b) with (101) to obtain Null(H e ) = span(ψ k−p+1 , . . . , ψ nt ), from which we obtain that
is the projection matrix onto Null(H e ), where
In turn, using (106) and (104a) in (6a) we obtain
(107) Third, the GSVD can be more simply described when the matrix H e has a full column-rank. To see this, first note from (3) and (5) that k = n t and p = 0,
respectively, and thus (6) specializes to
with [cf. 
and D r and D e as in (8) . Hence, it follows from (109) that
satisfies H ‡ e H e = I and thus is the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse of H e . Finally, from (109) and (110) we obtain
from which we see that the generalized singular values of (H r , H e ) in (9) are also the (ordinary) singular values of H r H ‡ e . We now turn to our secrecy capacity analysis in the high-SNR regime. There are two cases, which we consider separately.
B. Case I: rank(H e ) = n t
In this case, we use that (108) holds and so the GSVD is given by (109), and thus dim S r,e = s, dim S e = n t − s, and dim S r = dim S n = 0.
Achievability: In the equivalent parallel channel model of Fig. 4 , there are s subchannels that go to the intended receiver (and also to the eavesdropper, with different gains), which correspond to S r,e . Of these s subchannels, we use only the subset for which the gains to the intended receiver are stronger than those to the eavesdropper, and with these our communication scheme uses Gaussian wiretap codebooks.
In particular, we transmit
where ν is the smallest integer such that σ j > 1, and where the nonzero elements of u are i.i.d. CN(0, αP ) with α = 1/(n t σ max (Ω)) so that the transmitted power is at most P .
Using (111) and (109) in (1), the observations at the intended receiver and eavesdropper, respectively, take the form
In turn, via (19) , the (secrecy) rate achievable with this system is
as required.
Converse: It suffices to use Lemma 6 with the choices
and where H ‡ e is the pseudo-inverse defined in (110). With these choices of parameters, (94c) evaluates toĤ = 0, so we can ignore the maximization over K P in (94a). Simplifying (94) for our choice of parameters yields
which establishes our result.
C. Case II: rank(H e ) < n t In this case, we use the general form of the GSVD as given by (6), so now dim S r = p > 0 and dim S r,e = s > 0.
Achievability: In the equivalent parallel channel model of Fig. 4 , there are p subchannels that go only to the intended receiver, corresponding to S r , and s subchannels that go to both the intended receiver and eavesdropper (with different gains), corresponding to S r,e . Our communication scheme uses both sets of subchannels independently with Gaussian (wiretap) codebooks.
where v and u are the length-p and length-s auxiliary random vectors associated with communication over S r and S r,e , respectively. The elements of v are i.i.d. CN(0, (P − √ P )/p), corresponding to allocating power P − √ P to S r . For S r,e , we use only the subset of channels for which the gains to the intended receiver are stronger than those to the eavesdropper,
T , where ν is the smallest integer such that σ j > 1, and where the nonzero elements are i.i.d. CN(0, α √ P ), independent of v, with α = 1/(n t σ max (Ω 2 )) so that the power allocated to S r,e is at most √ P . With x as in (114), the observations at the intended receiver and eavesdropper, respectively, take the form
Via (19) , the system (115) achieves (secrecy) rate R = I(u, v; y r ) − I(u, v; y e ) = I(u; y r ) − I(u; y e ) + I(v; y r |u),
where (116) follows from the fact that v is independent of (y e , u), as (115b) reflects. Evaluating the terms in (116), we obtain
and I(v; y r |u) = log det
where (118) follows from the continuity of log det(·), and where (119) follows from (107). Substituting (117) and (119) into (116) yields our desired result.
Converse: To establish the converse, we use Lemma 6 with the choices
and
where Ξ is as defined in (112b), and where we choose
with T 21 , T 31 and T 32 as defined in (103), so that
The upper bound expression (94) can now be simplified as follows.
where Q is related to K P via
and satisfies tr(Q) ≤ P . From (122), (121) and (120), we have that the numerator in the right-hand side of (94b) simplifies to (123) at the top of the next page.
In turn, using (123) and the Fischer inequality (which generalizes Hadamard's inequality) for positive semidefinite matrices [30] , we obtain
which when used with (94) yields
the first term of which is identical to (113). Thus, it remains only to establish that
To obtain (124), let
denote the largest singular value of the matrix F 31 F † 31 + F 32 F † 32 . Since log det(·) is increasing on the cone of positive semidefinite matrices, we have
where (126) follows from the fact that γI − F 31
0, and (127) follows from the fact that water-filling provides a vanishingly small gain over flat power allocation when the channel matrix has a full rank (see, e.g., [31] ), and (128) follows from (107).
D. Analysis of the Masked MIMO Transmission Scheme
To establish (29), we focus on the two terms in the argument of (19) , obtaining
where we have used (27) to obtain the second equality, and
with h(y e ) = log det(I + P t H e H † e )
and h(y e |u) = log det(
where to obtain (132) we have used that V r V † r + V n V † n = I since V r V n is unitary, and where to obtain (133) we have used that det(I + AB) = det(I + BA) for any A and B of compatible dimensions.
In turn, substituting (131) and (133) into (130) we obtain, with some algebra,
Finally, using (129) and (134) in the argument of (19) , and again using (27) , we obtain [cf. (29) ]
as required. Finally, to establish the first equality in (30), we take the limit P t → ∞ in (29) . In particular, we have
where to obtain (135) we have used that (ǫI+M) 32] , and where we have also used that log det(I + W) is continuous in the entries of W.
VII. MIMOME CHANNEL SCALING LAWS
We first verify Claim 1, then use it to establish Corollary 2.
Proof of Claim 1: Clearly, σ max (H r , H e ) = ∞ when [cf. (2a)] S r = ∅. Otherwise, it is known (see, e.g., [33] ) that σ max (·) is the largest generalized singular value of (H r , H e ) as defined in (9) .
To establish that the secrecy capacity is zero whenever σ max (H r , H e ) ≤ 1, it suffices to consider the high-SNR secrecy capacity (24) when H e has full column-rank, which is clearly zero whenever σ max ≤ 1.
When σ max (H r , H e ) > 1, there exists a vector v such that H r v > H e v . Then, choosing x = u ∼ CN(0, P vv † ) in the argument of (19) yields a strictly positive rate R(P ), so C(P ) ≥ R(P ) > 0 for all P > 0.
Combining Claim 1 and Fact 1 below, which is established in [34, p. 642] , yields Corollary 2.
Fact 1 ( [34] , [35] ): Suppose that H r and H e have i.i.d. CN(0, 1) entries. Let n r , n e , n t → ∞, while keeping n r /n e = γ and n t /n e = β fixed. Then if β < 1,
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS This paper resolve several open questions regarding secure transmission with multiple antennas. First, it establishes the existence of a computable expression for the secrecy capacity of the MIMOME channel. Second, it establishes that a Gaussian input distribution optimizes the secrecy capacity expression of Csiszár and Körner for the MIMOME channel, and thus that capacity is achieved by Gaussian wiretap codes. Third, it establishes the optimum covariance structure for the input, exploiting hidden convexity in the problem. Nevertheless, many questions remain that are worth exploring. As one example, it remains to be determined whether such developments based on Sato's bounding techniques be extended beyond sum-power constraints, as the channel enhancement based approach of [22] can.
In addition, our analysis highlights the useful role that the GSVD plays both in calculating the capacity of the MIMOME channel in the high-SNR regime, and in designing codes for approaching this capacity. At the same time, we observed that a simple, semi-blind masked MIMO scheme can be arbtrarily far from capacity. However, for the special case of the MISOME channel, [4] shows that the corresponding masked beamforming scheme achieve rates close to capacity at high SNR. Thus, it remains to be determined whether there are better and/or more natural generalizations of the masked beamforming scheme for the general MIMOME channel. This warrants further investigation.
More generally, semi-blind schemes have the property that they require only partial knowledge of the channel to the eavesdropper. Much remains to be explored about what secrecy rates are achievable with such partial information. One recent work in this area [5] illustrates the use of interference alignment techniques for the compound extension of the multiantenna wiretap channel. Another recent work [36] , studies a constant-capacity compound wiretap channel model which again captures the constraint that the transmitter only knows the capacity (or an upper bound on the capacity) of the channel to the eavesdropper. Further insights may arise from considering other multiple eavesdropper scenarios with limited or no collusion.
Finally, we characterize when an eaversdropper can prevent secure communication, i.e., drive the secrecy capacity to zero. Our scaling laws on antenna requirements and their optimal distribution in limit of many antennas provide convenient rules of thumb for system designers, as the results become independent of the channel matrices in this limit. However, it remains to quantify for what numbers of antennas these asymptotic results become meaningful predictors of system behavior. As such, this represents yet another useful direction for further research. 
where (138) follows from the fact that U 1 U 2 is unitary, and where (139) follows from substituting for y r and y e from (1), using (45), from and the fact that
since
. Now when I(x; y r |y e ) < ∞, we have from (139) that Tx = 0, so I(x; y r |y e ) = I(x;ỹ r |y e ), establishing (38).
Similarly, I(x; y e |y r ) = I(x; V † 1 y e , V † 2 y e |y r )
= I(x;ỹ e , V † 1 y e − U † 1 y r |y r ) = I(x;ỹ e , Tx|y r ),
where we have used that V 1 V 2 is unitary to obtain (141) and (140) to obtain (142). When I(x; y e |y r ) < ∞, we have from (142) that Tx = 0, so I(x; y e |y r ) = I(x;ỹ e |y r ), establishing (41). To verify the "only if" statement of the last part of the claim, when I(x; y r |y e ) = ∞, we expand (139) via the chain rule to obtain I(x; y r |y e ) = I(x;ỹ r |y e ) + I(x; Tx|ỹ r , y e ),
and note that if Tx a.s.
= 0 then the second term on the righthand side of (143) is zero. But the first term on the right-hand side is finite, so cov(Tx) = 0, i.e., (44), holds.
To verify the "if" statement of the last part of the claim, we use the chain rule to write I(x; y r |y e ) = I(x;ỹ r , Tx|y e ) ≥ I(x; Tx|y e ) ≥ I(x; Tx) − I(x; y e ),
and note that the first term in (144) is infinite when cov(Tx) = 0, while the second term is finite.
To establish that I(x; y r |y e ) with z ∼ CN(0, K Φ ) for singular K Φ is maximized subject to the constraint cov(x) = K P when x is Gaussian (hence, justifying (50) in this case), we exploit Claim 2.
In particular, if for all p x meeting the covariance constraint we have I(x; y r |y e ) < ∞, then we can use (38), expanding and bounding I(x;ỹ r |y e ) in the same manner as (53)-(54), withỹ r ,z r ,Λ U † 2 ΛU 2 (the error covariance in the MMSE estimate ofỹ r from y e ), andΦ = U † 2 Φ [cf. (46)] replacing y r , z r , Λ, and Φ, respectively. Specifically, we obtain that I(x;ỹ r |y e ) = h(ỹ r |y e ) − h(z r |z e ),
is maximized when x is Gaussian. If, instead, there exists a p x satisfying the covariance constraint such that I(x; y r |y e ) = ∞, then by the "only if" part of the last statement of Claim 2 we have that (44) holds. But by the "if" part of the same statement we know that I(x; y r |y e ) = ∞ for any p x such that (44) holds, and in particular we may choose p x to be Gaussian.
APPENDIX III PROOF OF LEMMA 3 FOR SINGULARK Φ
We begin with the following: Claim 3: There exists a matrixH such that the combined channel matrix (4) can be expressed in the form
is the compact singular value decomposition ofK Φ , i.e., where W has orthogonal columns (W † W = I), and the diagonal matrixΞ has strictly positive diagonal entries. Hence, the column space of H is a subspace of the column space of W.
Proof: We establish our result by contradiction. Suppose the claim were false. Then clearly I(x; y r , y e ) = ∞ when we choose x = tυ where υ ∈ Null(W) and var t > 0, which implies that R + (K P ,K Φ ) = I(x; y r |y e ) = I(x; y r , y e ) − I(x; y e ) = ∞, since I(x; y e ) < ∞ as cov(z e ) = I is nonsingular. Hence,
But from (48) in Lemma 2 we know R + (K P ,K Φ ) < ∞, which contradicts (148) and hence (146) must hold.
Using Claim 3, we see that in this case the original channel (1) with cov(z) = K Φ can be replaced with the equivalent combined channelỹ =Hx +z
whereỹ W † y r y e ,z W † z, with cov(z) = Ξ. Hence, we can write R + (K P ,K Φ ) = I(x; y r , y e ) − I(x; y e ), where I(x; y r , y e ) = I(x;ỹ) = log det(Ξ +HK PH † ) det(Ξ)
and I(x; y e ) = log det(I + H eKP H † e ).
But from the saddle point property it follows thatΞ can be expressed as
In turn, the KKT conditions associated with the optimization (152) areΞ
or, equivalently,
where the dual variable Υ is of the same block diagonal form as in the nonsingular case, viz., (60). Multiplying the left-and right-hand sides of (153) by W and W † , respectively, and using (146) and (147) we obtain (63). Thus, the remainder of the proof uses the arguments following (63) in the proof for the nonsingular case to establish the desired result.
APPENDIX IV PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Consider first the right-hand side of (71). Since h(y r −Θy e ) is concave in K P ∈ K P and differentiable over K P , the KKT conditions associated with the Lagrangian L Θ (K P , λ, Ψ) = h(y r −Θy e ) + tr(ΨK P ) − λ(tr(K P ) − P ) (154) are both necessary and sufficient, i.e., K P is a solution to the right-hand side of (71) if and only if there exists a λ ≥ 0 and Ψ 0 such that (H r −ΘH e ) † Γ(K P ,K P ) −1 (H r −ΘH e ) + Ψ = λI, tr(ΨK P ) = 0, and λ(tr(K P ) − P ) = 0, 
Considering next the left-hand side of (71), to whichK P is a solution, we have, from the associated KKT conditions, that there exists λ ′ ≥ 0 and Ψ ′ 0 such that ∇ KP h(y r − Θ(K P )y e ) KP =KP + Ψ ′ = λ ′ I tr(Ψ ′K P ) = 0, and λ ′ (tr(K P ) − P ) = 0,
where Θ(K P ) is as defined in (18 
In turn, substituting for H andK Φ from (4) and (21), and using (17) , the first matrix inverse in (158) can be expressed in the form
where Λ(K P ) is as defined in (55), and where we have used the matrix inversion lemma (see, e.g., [32] 
Comparing (160) with the first equation in (155), we see that it remains only to show that Γ(K P ,K P ) =Λ, which is verified as follows. First,Θy e is the MMSE estimate of y r from y e when K P =K P , and Γ(K P ,K P ) = cov(y r − Θy e ) = cov(y r |y e ) is the error covariance associated with the estimate. But by definition [cf. (55)]Λ = cov(y r |y e ) is also the error covariance associated with the MMSE estimate when K P =K P , so the conclusion follows.
APPENDIX V PROOF OF LEMMA 4 FOR SINGULARK Φ First, note that via (47) with (48), we have that R + (K P ,K Φ ) = I(x; y r |y e ) < ∞ for all K P ∈ K P . Hence, via (38) of Claim 2 we have R + (K P ,K Φ ) = I(x;ỹ r |y e ), ∀ K P ∈ K P ,
with the equivalent observationsỹ r as given by (39) with (40). Moreover, the noise cross-covarianceΦ = U
